In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in games with strict Nash equilibria. In the model, each player picks the action which has the highest assessment, which is a weighted average of past payoffs. Each player updates his assessment of the chosen action in an adaptive manner. Almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium is shown under one of the following conditions: (i) that, at any non-Nash equilibrium action profile, there exists a player who can find another action which gives always better payoffs than his current payoff, (ii) that all non-Nash equilibrium action profiles give the same payoff. We show almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium in the following games: pure coordination games; the battle of the sexes game; the stag hunt game; and the first order static game. In the game of chicken and market entry games, players may end up playing a maximin action profile.
Introduction
Over the past few decades, learning models have received much attention in the theoretical and experimental literature of cognitive science. One such model is fictitious play, where players form beliefs about their opponents' play and best respond to these beliefs.
In fictitious play model, players know the payoff structure and their opponents' strategy sets.
Alternatively, there exist other learning models where players have limited information; players may not have information about payoff structure, opponents' strategy sets, or they may not even know whether they are playing against other players. Therefore, they may not be able to form beliefs about the way that the opponents play or all possible outcomes. What they do know is their own available actions and the results from the previous play, that is, the realized payoffs from chosen actions. Instead of forming beliefs about all possible outcomes, players make a subjective assessment on each action based on the realized payoffs from the action and tend to pick the action which has achieved better results than others in the past.
One such model with limited information is the reinforcement learning model introduced by Erev and Roth (1998) (ER, hereafter), where they model the observed behavior of agents in the lab. An agent in their model chooses an action randomly, where the choice probability of the action is the fraction of the payoffs realized from the action over the total payoffs realized for all available actions. Therefore, players play an action more often when the action has given better payoffs. Beggs (2005) provides a theoretical 2 basis for the model and shows that in 2×2 constant-sum games with unique equilibria, the strategies converge to the equilibria.
In another model of adaptive players with limited information, players make an assessment of each action, where the assessment is a weighted average of past payoffs, and they pick the action which has the highest assessment. Sarin and Vahid (1999) (SV, hereafter) provide the model in a decision problem and show that the decision maker ends up choosing the maximin actions. In the context of work on games, Sarin (1999) investigates the prisoner's dilemma game and shows that players end up playing for mutual cooperation or mutual defection.
Some authors have worked empirically on this model. Sarin and Vahid (2001) show that the SV model can explain the data by ER at least as well as the ER model does. Chen and Khoroshilov (2003) show that among learning models comprising the ER model, the SV model, and the experience-weighted attraction learning model by Camerer and Ho (1999) , the SV model can best explain the data in coordination games and cost sharing games.
SV also introduce random shocks on decision maker's assessments in the model; the decision maker now experiences temporal emotional shocks on his assessments in each decision period, so that he may not always pick the best action. SV show that (1) assessment of the action which is played infinitely often converges in distribution to a random variable whose expected value is the expected objective payoff and (2) if one action first-order stochastically dominates the other, then the former action is played more often than the other on average. Leslie and Collins (2006) investigate the model 3 in games with slightly different updating rules and show convergence of strategies to a Nash distribution 1 in 2-player partnership games and 2-player zero-sum games. Cominetti, Melo and Sorin (2010) show the general convergence result of the case in which players of the SV model with emotional shocks play a normal form game and each player's choice rule is the logistic choice rule. They show that players' choice probabilities converge to a unique Nash distribution if the noise term of the logistic choice rule for each player is big enough. By a property of the logistic choice rule if its noise term becomes large then the choice probability approaches a uniform distribution.
Hence, players in their model are more likely to choose an action which does not have the highest assessment each time. However, players in the SV model without emotional shocks do not choose the actions; they always pick the action which they think is the best based on past payoff realizations.
In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which myopic players in the SV model without emotional shocks behave in the long run in general games, mostly in coordination games, which are of interest to a wide range of researchers 2 . In this model, the initial assessment of each action is assumed to take a value between the maximum and the minimum payoff that the action can provide 3 . For instance, players may have experienced the game in advance so they may use their knowledge of previous payoffs to form an initial assessment of each action. Given those initial assessments, 1 Nash distribution is Nash equilibrium under stochastic perturbations on payoffs. If the expected values of the perturbations are 0, then Nash distribution coincides with the quantal response equilibrium proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) . 2 As examples of experimental work on coordination games, Cooper, DeJoung, Forsythe and Ross (1992) and Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) have investigated which among multiple Nash equilibria, is the one played in the lab. 3 See also Sarin (1999) 4 each player picks the action which has the highest assessment.
After players have played a game and received the payoffs, each player updates his assessment using the realized payoff; the new assessment of a chosen action is a convex combination of the current assessment and the realized payoff. In the present paper, the weights on the realized payoffs are assumed to be random variables, meaning that players are not sure how much they incorporate the new payoff information into their assessments, which may be also affected by their mood. As a special instance, we also consider some cases in which those weights are non-random variables; we consider specific realized values of random weighting parameters. For example, we consider players who believe that the situation they are involved in is stationary so that each action's assessment is the arithmetic mean of its past payoffs. We also consider the case where players believe that the environment is non-stationary and put the same weight on all new payoff information.
Since the initial assessment of each action is assume to be smaller than the best payoff that the action can give, each player increases his assessment of the action when he receives the best payoff. If one action profile gives the best payoff to all players and they play it at some period, then players will choose the action profile at all subsequent periods. We call such action profiles absorbing states.
Furthermore, there exist other cases where players stick to one action profile. One such case is that their assessments of other actions become so low that the actions are never tried again. Another case is that payoffs from the action profile are greater than the other assessments and players keep playing the action profile, even though it does 5 not give them the best payoffs. It is shown that each pure Nash equilibrium is always a candidate of the convergence point, that is, for each strict Nash equilibrium there exists a range of assessments for all players and actions such that players stick to the Nash equilibrium forever. In addition, if (i) at any non-Nash equilibrium action profile, at least one player can find another action which always gives a better payoff than the current payoff from the non-Nash action, or (ii) all non-Nash equilibrium action profiles give the same payoff, then players end up playing a strict Nash equilibrium with probability one.
To see this in detail, we consider 2×2 coordination games and one non-2×2 coordination game. In 2×2 coordination games, since only two actions are available for each player, we can divide them into three categories according to the numbers of absorbing states; from games with zero absorbing state to games with two absorbing states 4 .
Coordination games with two absorbing states include the battle of the sexes and pure coordination games, where two absorbing states correspond to pure Nash equilibria. Coordination games with one absorbing state can be subdivided into the following cases:
(1) the absorbing state corresponds to a Nash equilibrium; and (2) the absorbing state corresponds to one non-Nash equilibrium action profile. Coordination games in case (1) include the stag hunt game, while coordination games in case (2) include the game of chicken and market entry games. In coordination games with two absorbing states, (i) if the maximin actions of both players coincide, then they converge to play a Nash equilibrium with probability one, (ii) if the maximin actions do not coincide for both players, then players end up playing a Nash equilibrium or the maximin action profile with probability one. In coordination games in case (1), players end up playing a Nash equilibrium with probability one if players receive their worst payoffs at different action profiles. In coordination games in case (2), players end up playing a strict Nash equilibrium or the maximin action profile.
In a non-2×2 coordination game introduced by Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) (VHBB, hereafter), each player is asked to pick a number from a finite set. If players fail to coordinate, the player who picks the smallest number among players' choices receives the highest payoff. In addition, each number gives a better payoff when the choice is closer to the smallest number among all the players' choices. We show that each Nash equilibrium, in which players coordinate to pick the same number, is absorbing 5 . It is also shown that the smallest number of the players' choices weakly decreases over time and converges to some number. Next, we consider the case where the second best payoff from each action is lower than the payoff from the maximin action, which is the smallest number of their choice set. Hence, players are better off if they choose the smallest number of their choice set when they fail to pick the smallest number among the players' choices. In this case, we show that players end up playing a Nash equilibrium with probability one, which can be also observed in the experimental results by VHBB.
There are M players who play the same game repeatedly over periods. Let N = {1, ..., M } be the set of players. In each period, n ∈ N, each player chooses an action from his own action set simultaneously. Let S i be the finite set of actions for player i ∈ N. After the players choose actions, each player receives a payoff. If players
.., s I ). When choosing an action, each player does not know the payoff functions or the environment in which he is involved.
In each period, each player assigns subjective assessments on his actions; Q i n (s i ) ∈ R denotes player i's assessment on action s i in period n. Let Q i n be the vector of assessments for all actions for player i. We assume that the initial assessment for each action and each player takes a value between the maximum and the minimum value that the action gives; thus,
In each period, each player chooses the action which he believes will give the highest payoff; given his assessments, he chooses the action which has the highest assessment in the period. Therefore, if s i * n is the action that player i chooses in period n, then
For a tie break situation, which arises when more than two actions have the highest assessment, we do not assume a specific tie break rule. However, a specific tie break rule makes some results simpler. We say that a tie break rule satisfies the inertia condition if players pick the action which was chosen in the last period; if actions which have the highest assessment were not chosen in the last period, then players pick one of the actions randomly. As a comparison, we also introduce another tie break condition, the uniform condition, where players pick each of the actions which have the highest assessment with equal probability.
After playing the game in each period, each player observes only his own payoff; players observe neither their opponents' actions nor their payoffs. Given his own realized payoff, each player updates his assessment of the action chosen in the previous period.
Specifically, if player i receives a payoff u i n (s i , s −i ) when players play (s i , s −i ), then he updates Q i n as follows;
where λ i n (s i ) is player i's weighting parameter for action s i in period n. We assume that λ i n (s i ) is a random variable which takes a value between 0 and 1; λ i n (s i ) ∈ (0, 1).
It reflects the idea that players are uncertain how far to incorporate the new payoff information into their new assessments. The uncertainty can also be interpreted as players' emotional shocks. How far they incorporate the new payoff information depends on their random mood. We also assume that the sequence of weighting parameters, {λ i n (s i )} i,n,s i is independent among periods, players and actions and it is identically distributed among periods. We assume that the weighting parameter λ i n (s i ) has a density function which is strictly positive on the domain (0, 1) for all i and s i .
Results
In this section, we investigate the convergence results in general games. In later sections, we focus on specific games, in particular coordination games. We say ( s i ) i∈I is absorbing if players play the action profile in any period then they play it in all subsequent periods.
and (ii) for all i there exists r −i such that
then (s i ) i∈I is absorbing.
Proof. Consider the case where players pick the action profile (s i ) i∈I in some period n.
In the case, player i receives the payoff u i (s i , s −i ). Note that the value u i (s i , s −i ) is the maximum value that action s i can give; therefore, by condition (ii), player i inflates the assessment of the action s i . Since the assessments of other actions do not change in the next period, player i plays action s i in period n + 1 again. Since this logic can be applied to other periods and we pick player i randomly, players play the same action profile in all the subsequent periods. Q.E.D.
If the inertia condition is always assumed for each player's tie break rule, then the condition (ii) in Proposition 1 is not required. However, if the uniform condition is assumed, without condition (ii), players may not converge to play one action profile. As an extreme example, if two actions give the same payoff for any opponents' actions and the payoff is higher than any other payoffs that any other action can give, then he plays those two actions with equal probability forever.
From Proposition 1, it is easy to see that even action profiles which consist of dominated strategies for all players can be absorbing. To see why, assume that two players play the prisoner's dilemma game which has the following payoff matrix;
where the strategy "C" is strictly dominated by the strategy "D" for both players.
Notice that at (C,C), both players receive the highest payoffs from the action "C";
for for both players. Hence, if players play (C,C) once, then they always play it afterwards 6 .
In the next statement, we show that player i stops playing an action if the assessment of the action becomes smaller than the minimum payoff that another action can give;
in some period n for t i = s i , then player i does not choose s i after period n.
Notice that s i is not chosen in period n. Since the assessment of the chosen action is a convex combination of realized payoff and the assessment of the previous period with λ i n ∈ (0, 1) for all i and n, we have
Notice also that s i is not chosen in period n and thus the assessment of the action is unchanged in
player i will not choose s i in period n + 1. The same logic can be applied in later periods and thus player i will not choose s i in any subsequent periods. Q.E.D.
Once the assessment of one action becomes lower than the worst payoff from another action, then the action will not be chosen forever. Therefore, if the worst payoff from one action is greater than the best payoff from another action, then the latter action is never chosen at any time. One natural question is whether players end up playing a strict Nash equilibrium. In the following statement, we show that for any strict Nash equilibrium, there exist assessments for all players such that the players end up playing the strict Nash equilibrium:
Proposition 3. For any strict Nash equilibrium, there exist assessments in period n for all players such that they play the Nash equilibrium in the period and all subsequent periods.
Proof. Let (s i * ) i∈N be a strict Nash equilibrium and s i * be player i's strategy at the strict Nash equilibrium. Then, we have the following condition; for all i ∈ N ,
for all t i = s i * . We assume that in period n, the following conditions for assessments satisfy; for all i,
and
for all t i = s i * . Condition (3) holds, since by condition (1), the minimum value of the assessment of action t i is less than or equal to u i (t i , s −i * ), which is strictly less than u i (s i * , s −i * ). Thus, players play the strict Nash equilibrium in period n. Note that
for all t i = s i * and players play the strict Nash equilibrium again in period n+1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 says that any strict Nash equilibrium is always a candidate of the convergence point. However, it is possible that players end up playing a non-Nash equilibrium. Hence, it is natural to consider the case where if they converge to play one action profile, then it should be a strict Nash equilibrium. Notice that if one action profile (s i ) i∈I is played forever, then (1) each player receives a better payoff than the assessment of chosen action and he plays the action again, (2) each player receives a 13 payoff which is not better than the assessment of chosen action, but the assessments of the other actions are less than the payoff, so that he plays the action again, or (3) the action gives the same payoff for any other players' actions, so that the assessment of the action is unchanged and the assessments of other actions are strictly less than the assessment of the action 7 .
We say that players end up playing (s i ) i∈I if there exists n such that for all periods after n, players play (
and s i = t i , then players end up playing (s i ) i∈I 8 . In the following statements, we focus on the cases where all pure Nash equilibria are strict. We also assume that there do not exist any redundant actions which always give the same constant payoff; for any i ∈ N and actions s i , t i ∈ S i , s i = t i , the following condition does not hold;
Lemma 1. For any initial assessments, players never end up playing (s i , s −i ) if ∃i ∈ N ,
Proof. We prove by contradiction; we assume that there exists a set of assessments such that players end up playing (s i ) i∈I . Hence, there exists n such that for all m > n,
. However, again the condition contradicts the hypothesis. Q.E.D.
If condition (4) is satisfied at non-Nash equilibrium action profiles, then players never end up playing one of them. It is also obvious that the condition is not satisfied at each strict Nash equilibrium. Condition (4) means that there exists at least one player who can find an action which always gives a better payoff for than his current payoff from the action. Though the condition limits the class of games, still there exist interesting games which satisfy the condition. For example, the stag hunt game satisfies condition (4) at non-Nash equilibrium action profiles and has the following payoff matrix;
Rabbit Stag Rabbit 1,1 2,0 Stag 0,2 5,5
At non-Nash equilibrium action profile, one player decides to hunt a stag while the other player decides to hunt a rabbit. The player who decides to hunt a stag fails and receives nothing and the payoff is less than the minimum payoff from hunting a rabbit, 1, which is given when both players decide to hunt a rabbit together and share it.
Another coordination game which satisfies condition (4) The first column represents player i's choice while the first row represents the minimum value of his opponents' choices. It is easy to see that at each Nash equilibrium, all players pick the same number. Since action 1 gives at least 1 and players who fail to pick the smallest number receives at most 0, this game satisfies the condition (4).
In both games, condition (4) holds strictly. In other games, such as the battle of the sexes and pure coordination games, condition (4) holds weakly, in particular
where E * is the set of pure Nash equilibria. For instance, the battle of the sexes game has the following payoff;
In the following theorem, we show that players end up playing a Nash equilibrium almost surely if (i) condition (4) is satisfied strictly at non-Nash equilibrium profiles, or (ii) if each player's payoffs at non-Nash equilibrium action profiles are equal; Theorem 1. Players end up playing a strict Nash equilibrium almost surely if (i)
Proof. See Appendix.
VHBB Coordination Games
We first consider the coordination game proposed by Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990), where there exist M players with S i = S = {1, 2, ..., J} for all i ∈ N = {1, ..., M } and players have the following payoff function;
where a > b > 0 for all i ∈ N . If J=4, then player i's payoffs are shown by the following matrix;
where the numbers in the first column correspond to player i's action and the numbers in the first row correspond to the minimum values of the opponents' actions. It is easy to check that (j, j, j, ...., j), j ∈ S, is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Notice that the pure Nash equilibria except (1, 1, ..., 1) are absorbing. However, if we assume the inertia condition for each player's tie break rule, then (1, 1, ..., 1) is also absorbing. In this section, we assume that each player's tie break rule satisfies the inertia condition.
Lemma 2. For j ∈ S, the pure Nash equilibrium (j, j, ..., j) is absorbing.
When a player is choosing the smallest action among players' actions, he is receiving the best payoff that the action can give. Therefore, the player does not change his action when he is choosing the smallest action except when he chooses 1 and is facing a tie break situation. If the inertia condition is satisfied, then he chooses 1 forever and the minimum value of actions does not increase over time. Moreover, since the minimum value is bounded below, it converges.
Lemma 3. The minimum value of actions among players is non-increasing over periods and converges almost surely.
We additionally assume that each action's second best payoff, a(j − 1) − bj for j ∈ S/{1}, is less than the secure payoff, a − b. That is,
for all j ∈ S/{1}. This means that each player receives a payoff better than the secure payoff only when his choice is the smallest among all players' choices. Given this assumption, players end up playing a Nash equilibrium. Proof. If a player is choosing an action which is not the smallest action among players, then the payoff which the action gives is less than a−b. Let j(n) be the minimum value of actions in period n. From Lemma 3, j(n) ≥ j(m) for m ≥ n. Hence, actions which are strictly greater than j(n) always give a payoff less than a − b after period n. Therefore, each player, say player i, never plays s > j(n) infinitely often. If s > j(n) is played infinitely often, then the assessment of the action becomes lower than a − b in some period m > n with probability one; that is, the assessment of the action becomes lower than the assessment of action 1. Since the assessment of the action 1 never changes, he never plays action s afterwards, which contradicts the hypothesis. Thus, after some period l > n, player i plays j(n) or some lower action. If all players play j = j(n), then players play (j, j, ..., j) afterwards. If one player plays k < j(n) in period m > n and j(m) = k, then we can apply the same logic. If j(n) = 1, then there is no lower number that players can choose and they end up playing Nash equilibrium (1, 1, ..., 1) . Since there are finitely many players and actions, players end up playing a Nash equilibrium almost surely. Q.E.D.
2×2 Coordination Games
In this section, we focus on 2×2 coordination games, which have the following payoff matrix; where a 11 > a 21 , a 22 > a 12 , b 11 > b 12 and b 22 > b 21 hold. Note that in these coordination games, the pure Nash equilibria are (s 1 1 , s 2 1 ) and (s 1 2 , s 2 2 ). For the purpose of analysis, we divide 2×2 coordination games into three categories according to the number of absorbing states. By the updating rule and assumption of initial assessments, an action profile is absorbing when each player receives the best payoff from the action.
Note that the division of games depends on the assumption on players' tie break rules 10 .
10 For instance, if a player's tie break rule satisfies the inertia condition, then when both actions have an equal assessment and the action which is picked always gives a constant payoff, then he chooses the action again in the next period. Therefore, it may be an absorbing state. However, if he uses a uniform tie break rule, then the player chooses the other action with positive probability, so the action is not an absorbing state.
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In this section, we assume that each player's tie break rule satisfies the uniform condition.
With the condition, action profile (s 1 i , s 2 j ) is absorbing if a ij > a ik and b ij > b lj for j = k and i = l. It is easy to check that there exist three possible cases for general 2×2 games: (1) both diagonal or both off-diagonal action profiles are absorbing states;
(2) only one action profile is an absorbing state; or (3) there does not exist any absorbing state.
Since 2×2 coordination games have additional conditions, off-diagonal action profiles cannot be absorbing at the same time. Therefore, the condition for (1) is as follows;
(1) min{a 11 , a 22 } > max{a 21 , a 12 } and min{b 11 , b 22 } > max{b 12 , b 21 }.
In the case of (2) and (3), the following condition should hold:
(2), (3) min{a 11 , a 22 } ≤ max{a 21 , a 12 } or min{b 11 , b 22 } ≤ max{b 12 , b 21 }.
Without loss of generality, we assume for case (2) and (3) In the following sections, we investigate games in categories (1), (2-1), (2-2) and
(3). Specifically, the following games are considered: the battle of the sexes game and pure coordination games from category (1), the stag hunt game from category (2-1) and market entry games and the game of chicken from category (2-2) and (3).
The Battle of the Sexes Game and Pure Coordination Games
In this subsection we consider coordination games in category (1) . Games in this category satisfy the following conditions; min{a 11 , a 22 } > max{a 21 , a 12 } and min{b 11 , b 22 } > max{b 12 , b 21 } and on-diagonal action profiles, pure Nash equilibria, are absorbing states.
The condition says that for both players, coordinating one of the Nash equilibria gives a better payoff than playing non-Nash equilibrium profiles. It is easy to see that the battle of the sexes game and pure coordination games satisfy the condition. For instance, the battle of the sexes game has the following payoff matrix;
Opera Football Opera 1, 2 0, 0 Football 0, 0 2, 1
In this game, the row player prefers going to a football game together to going to an opera together, while the column player enjoys going to the opera together more than going to a football game together. However, players are worse off when they fail to coordinate to go to one of them.
By Theorem 1, we know that players end up playing a pure Nash equilibrium almost surely;
Corollary 1. In 2×2 coordination games in category (1), if u 1 (s 1 k , s 2 l ) ≥ u 1 (s 1 l , s 2 k ) and
for k = l, then players end up playing a pure Nash equilibrium.
Another case to be considered is that each player receives the worst payoff from the same action profile. Assume that players have the following payoff matrix;
Opera Football Opera 1,2 0,0 Football 0.5,0.5 2,1
Notice that the row player enjoys going to a football game alone more than going
to an opera alone. The column player is in the opposite situation -she enjoys going to the opera alone more than going to the football game alone. In this case, it is a possible outcome that players fail to coordinate and they end up playing their favored actions (Football, Opera). and u 2 (s 1 k , s 2 l ) > u 2 (s 1 l , s 2 k ) for k = l, then players end up playing a Nash equilibrium or
Proof. Since (s 1 l , s 2 k ) gives the worst payoff for both players, they never play (s 1 l , s 2 k )
infinitely often. Notice, too, that if Q 1 (s 1 l ) < a kl and Q 2 (s 2 k ) < b kl , then player 1 never plays s 1 l and player 2 never plays s 2 k ; they end up playing (s 1 k , s 2 l ). In sum, players end up playing a Nash equilibrium or (s 1 k , s 2 l ).Q.E.D.
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The Stag Hunt Game
In this subsection, we consider coordination games in category (2-1), where the conditions a 11 > a 21 ≥ a 22 > a 12 and b 11 > b 21 hold. For example, the stag hunt game satisfies this condition; the condition b 11 > b 12 ≥ b 22 > b 21 holds in the stag hunt game.
For instance, the stag hunt game has the following payoff matrix; It is worth noting that in the stag hunt game, Nash equilibrium (s 1 2 , s 2 2 ) is not absorbing. However, players end up playing one of pure Nash equilibria, including (s 1 2 , s 2 2 ).
In the stag hunt game, at each off-diagonal action profile, one player receives the worst payoff. Therefore, by Theorem 1, players end up playing a Nash equilibrium almost surely. In category (2-1), a slightly weaker condition on off-diagonal payoffs is required for convergence to a Nash equilibrium; 
The Game of Chicken and Market Entry Games
In this subsection, we first consider coordination games in category (2-2), where b 21 > b 11
and a 21 > a 22 hold. Since (s 1 2 , s 2 1 ) is absorbing, convergence to a Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed in games in this category. For example, the game of chicken satisfies the condition, where it has the following payoff matrix: where each player shows his cowardice to the audiences when he swerves while his opponent stays. If both players swerve, then both of them are safe and receive nothing.
However, the best outcome for each player is that he stays while the opponent swerves, so that he can gain reputation. The worst scenario is that both players stay and have a severe accident.
Note that when they play (Swerve, Swerve), the assessment for the action "Swerve"
for both players does not deteriorate and they continue to play (Swerve, Swerve). Notice that they never end up at (Stay, Stay). If so, then one player's assessment of action "Stay" becomes lower than -1 at some point and the player stops playing the action.
In addition, when players play action profiles except (Swerve, Swerve), there exists a positive probability that the assessment of "Stay" becomes lower than -1. If so, the player stops playing "Stay" and they end up playing a Nash equilibrium or (Swerve, Swerve).
For this type of game, we have the following result: if player 2's assessment of "Enter" is greater or equal to 0 and players end up playing (Stay Out, Stay Out) otherwise. Since (Enter, Enter) gives the worst payoff to both players, at some point, at least one player's assessment of "Enter" becomes lower than 0. Therefore, players end up playing one of the action profiles, except for (Enter, Enter).
Non-Random Weight Parameters
In this section, we assume that players' weighting parameters are not random variables.
For example, players may believe that all past experiences equally represent the corresponding action's value, that is, players believe that the environments in which they are involved are stationary. Therefore, in each period, players put the same weight on all past experiences and players' assessments become arithmetic mean of past payoffs.
Note that the weighting parameters for each player are as follows; λ i n (s i j ) = 1 τ (n)+1 for all i ∈ N and s i j ∈ S i where τ (n) is the number of times that the action s i j is played until period n.
We also consider the players who have the following weighting parameters; λ i n (s i j ) = λ for all i, s i j and n as in Sarin and Vahid (2001) ; all players have constant weighting parameters in all periods, that is, both players always put the same weight on the received payoff in each period. It is reasonable to assume this condition if players believe that the situations facing them are non-stationary. If λ is close to 1, then players believe that only the most recent payoffs give information about the values of corresponding actions.
If λ is close to 0, then players believe that initial assessments of actions mostly represent the actions' value.
In this section, we consider the battle of the sexes game, in which players may play off-diagonal action profiles alternately without ending up at a Nash equilibrium. In detail, we first consider the case where λ i n (s i j ) = 1 τ (n)+1 for all i, s i j and n and offdiagonal payoffs for each player are all equivalent; a 12 = a 21 , b 12 = b 21 . In particular, we assume that a 12 = 0 and b 12 = 0.
As an example, consider the case where players' initial assessments are as follows:
is an irrational number. In this case, in the first period, they play (s 1 2 , s 2 1 ) and both players receive payoff 0. In period 2, players' assessments are as follows:
Notice that the assessments of s 1 1 and s 2 2 are greater than the assessments of s 1 2 and s 2 1 . Hence, players play (s 1 1 , s 2 2 ) and both players receive payoff 0. Using the payoff information in period 2, they update their assessments and they have the following assessments in period 3: Q 1 2 (s 1 1 ) = 1 2 (0.2), Q 1 2 (s 1 2 ) = 1 2 (0.2 + ), Q 2 2 (s 2 1 ) = 1 2 (0.2 + ), Q 2 2 (s 2 2 ) = 1 2 (0.2). Then players play (s 1 2 , s 2 1 )
in period 3. Notice that their assessments of action s 1 1 and s 2 2 never coincide with the assessments of action s 1 2 and s 2 1 at any period because of . After period 3, players play (s 1 2 , s 2 1 ) until the corresponding assessments become lower than the assessments of (s 1 1 , s 2 2 ). After the event, players again switch, playing (s 1 1 , s 2 2 ), and so on.
When λ i n (s i j ) = 1 τ (n)+1 for all i, s i j and n, the following statement shows the condition of initial assessments for coordination failures, which is the play on off-diagonal action profiles alternately. In this section, we assume that players' tie break rules satisfy the 29 inertia condition.
Proposition 8. In 2 × 2 coordination games with a 12 = a 21 = b 12 = b 21 = 0, under the inertia condition, if λ i n (s i j ) = 1 τ (n)+1 for all i, s i j and n, then the necessary and sufficient condition for the coordination failure is as follows:
This result says that players will play non-Nash equilibria alternately forever if and only if players' ratios of initial assessments "coordinate".
Next, we consider the players who have the following weighting parameters; λ i n (s i j ) = λ for all i, s i j and n. The necessary and sufficient condition of initial assessments for the coordination failure is as follows:
Proposition 9. In 2 × 2 coordination games with a 12 = a 21 = b 12 = b 21 = 0, under the inertia condition, if λ i n (s i j ) = λ for all i, s i j and n, then the necessary and sufficient condition for the coordination failure is as follows; for some z ∈ Z,
Since players play a Nash equilibrium forever if they coordinate once on the Nash equilibrium, for each case, the negation of the condition is the one for the success of coordination. For instance, if off-diagonal payoffs are all zero and players are frequentists, then they coordinate at some period and at all subsequent periods if and only if the initial assessments for both players and actions should satisfy the following conditions:
Coordinated Play on the Off-Diagonal Action Profiles
It is an interesting question whether the empirical frequency of play on the off-diagonal action profiles converges to the mixed Nash equilibrium. In fictitious play, Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that every 2×2 game with the diagonal property 11 has the fictitious play property; the empirical frequency of past play, which is a belief of players about an opponent player's behavior, converges to a Nash equilibrium.
First note that 2 × 2 coordination games with a 21 = a 12 = b 12 = b 21 = 0 also have the diagonal property. In the case, under the condition of coordination failure, players forever play off-diagonal action profiles alternately. However, the frequency of the play need not converge to the mixed Nash equilibrium. We show this by an example.
Consider the battle of the sexes game which has the following payoff matrix; We assume that weighting parameters and initial assessments for players are as fol-
Under the inertia condition for both players, it is easy to see that players play action profiles in the following order; 
Discussion
This model can be also interpreted as a population model. Consider the situation in which there exist two large populations of naive players. In each period one player is picked from each population randomly and plays a 2×2 coordination game, but he can play the game only once 12 . After each player plays the game, he reports the payoff which he has received to each population. We assume that each population does not share information with the other population. Each population accumulates information 12 Or each population is so large that the probability that a player plays a game again is almost 0.
32 as a public assessment, which consists of realized payoffs and the initial assessment. In each period, the public assessment of the action which is played is updated, using realized payoffs as defined above; the convex combination of the realized payoff and the public assessment in the previous period. Each player may not know whether he is playing a game, but he knows the public assessment. Using the public assessment, each player chooses an action which has the highest public assessment.
For example consider the battle of the sexes game. After the result of going to the opera or the football, both players report the realized payoff to the population which they belong to so that people in the population can make an assessment before they play the game themselves. The result above says that players from two different populations never coordinate when initial assessments satisfy the condition in Proposition 8 when they are frequentists. Otherwise, players coordinate to play one of the pure Nash equilibria.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
It is a direct consequence from Lemma 1 that if players end up playing one action profile, then it should be a strict Nash equilibrium. Therefore, it should be shown that they actually end up playing one action profile.
(i) At any non-Nash equilibrium action profile, there exists a positive probability such that one player who is receiving a worse payoff stops playing the action and plays another action. Note that at the non-Nash equilibrium action profile, (s i ) i , the player 33 who is suffering the worse payoff never plays his current action at least with the following probability:
where A := {Q i n−1 (s i ) > Q i n−1 (t i )∀i ∈ N, ∀t i = s i } and this probability is bounded below by the following probability:
Since the sets of players and actions are finite, if players play a non-Nash equilibrium action profile infinitely often, then the player who receives a worse payoff stops playing the action with probability one. Therefore, players do not play a non-Nash equilibrium action profile infinitely often. Hence, we assume that players only play some Nash equilibrium action profiles. The cases to be considered are that players play some Nash equilibria alternately without converging one of them. Since the game which we consider here has only strict Nash equilibria, all players should change their strategies at the same time when they change from one Nash equilibrium to another. Let (s i * ) i∈N and (s i * * ) i∈N be two different strict Nash equilibrium action profiles which are played infinitely often. In this argument, we assume that players play only those two strict Nash equilibria alternately. The argument can be extended easily to the case where players play more than two Nash equilibria.
Note that since players change one strict Nash equilibrium action profile to another strict Nash equilibrium action profile at the same time, all players should receive the 34 payoffs which are strictly less than their current assessments. It should be true that u i (s i * , s −i * ) = u i (s i * * , s −i * * ) for all i and each player i's assessment never reaches the level u i (s i * , s −i * ) in a finite period. In the following argument, we show that players fail to play strict Nash equilibria alternately with probability one; to show that, we consider the periods in which players change from (s i * * ) i∈N to (s i * ) i∈N .
By the assumption on weighting parameters, we can ignore the case where Q i (s i * ) = Q i (s i * * ). Note also that we have the following results. Consider period n such that the condition Q i n−1 (s i * ) > Q i n−1 (s i * * ) > Q i n (s i * ) holds. Then for any small ε ∈ (0, 1), there where C := {Q i n−1 (s i * ) > Q i n−1 (s i * * ) > Q i n (s i * )}. Note that for j = i, we have Pr(Q i n+1 (s i * * ) ≥ Q i n (s i * )) × Pr(Q j n+1 (s j * * ) < Q j n (s j * )) ≥ e 1,ij , and for the case Q j n (s j * ) < εu j (s j * * , s −j * * ) + (1 − ε)Q j n (s j * * )
for j = i, we have
for some e 1ij > 0 and e 2,ij > 0. In any cases, the probability that players fail to play the same strict Nash equilibrium in period n + 1 has positive probability which has the lower bound min h∈{1,2} min ij,i =j {e h,ij } > 0. Since players change from (s i * * ) i∈N to (s i * ) i∈N infinitely many times, players fail to play strict Nash equilibrium with probability one, which contradicts the hypothesis. Therefore, the only possibility is that players play only one Nash equilibrium after some period.
(ii) Note that if the condition in (ii) satisfies, then the payoff from any Nash equilibrium should be greater than the payoff from non-Nash equilibrium; u i (s i * , s −i * ) > u i (s i , s −i ) for all i ∈ N, (s i * ) ∈ E * , and (s i ) / ∈ E * . Therefore, each pure Nash equilibrium is absorbing and players who play a Nash equilibrium once play it forever. By the same logic as the proof in (i), players cannot play only non-Nash equilibrium action profiles forever. That is, with probability one, players play a Nash equilibrium at some 37 time and then play it in all subsequent periods. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8
We assume that each player's initial assessments of both actions are different. Then the condition of coordination failure under the inertia condition for each player's tie break rule is as follows; for j = k and (1) for the initial assessment, Q i 0 (s i j ) > Q i 0 (s i k ) and
where if one of the inequalities holds, then (i)
the assessment of action s i j when only (s i j , s −i k ) is played t times where j = k. Then it can be easily verified that the condition for coordination failure is equivalent to the following condition; for any u, t ∈ N,
Therefore, in the following proofs, we use the latter condition.
The important factor of this argument is that the players change actions at the same time and they 'coordinate' at coordination failure. If the players coordinate on diagonal action profiles once, then they succeed in coordinating. Therefore if the following conditions are satisfied, players never coordinate; for any m and n ∈ N, 38 holds, where equalities among them do not hold consecutively; if one of the equalities holds at m, n then both inequalities hold strictly at m, n−1 and m, n+1. In the following argument, we show that this condition is equivalent to the following condition:
To make this clear, we assume first that if one of inequalities holds with equality, then both inequalities should hold with equality. Then the original condition above can be expressed as follows:
Q 1 0 (s 1 2 ) < m n Q 1 0 (s 1 1 ) and Q 2 0 (s 2 2 ) > n m Q 2 0 (s 2 1 ) or Q 1 0 (s 1 2 ) > m n Q 1 0 (s 1 1 ) and Q 2 0 (s 2 2 ) < n m Q 2 0 (s 2 1 )
or Q 1 0 (s 1 2 ) = m n Q 1 0 (s 1 1 ) and Q 2 0 (s 2 2 ) = n m Q 2 0 (s 2 1 ).
Note that if
is a rational number, then there exist m and n such that . This means that Q 1 0 (s 1 2 ) > m n Q 1 0 (s 1 1 ) and Q 2 0 (s 2 2 ) > n m Q 2 0 (s 2 1 ) and it contradicts the conditions above. Hence the following relation
is the only case which satisfies the condition above.
Now consider the other cases. There exist m and n ∈ N such that 1 n Q i 0 (s i 1 ) = 1 m Q i 0 (s i 2 ) and 1 n Q j 0 (s j 2 ) = 1 m Q j 0 (s j 1 ), say 1 n Q j 0 (s j 2 ) > 1 m Q j 0 (s j 1 ), 13 . Then
should hold. Notice that
should be a rational number n m . Moreover, by the conditions above, we have n+1 m > Q j 0 (s j 2 ) Q j 0 (s j 1 )
> n m . It is easy to see that at 2n and 2m, the following conditions also satisfy; 1 2n Q i 0 (s i 1 ) = 1 2m Q i 0 (s i 2 ) and 1 2n Q j 0 (s j 2 ) > 1 2m Q j 0 (s j 1 ). Thus we have the following condition: 2n+1 2m > Q j 0 (s j 2 ) Q j 0 (s j 1 )
> 2n 2m . Using the same logic, the condition should be satisfied for any kn and km where k ∈ N. If k → ∞, then the condition becomes as follows; n m ≥ Q j 0 (s j 2 ) Q j 0 (s j 1 )
> n m . However, there do not exist initial assessments which satisfy this condition 14 . Therefore the necessary and sufficient condition for ini-
14 If 1 n Q j 0 (s j 2 ) < 1 m Q j 0 (s j 1 ) then it satisfies that n+1 m < Q j 0 (s < n m . By the same argument, There exist no initial assessments which satisfy the conditions. 40 tial assessments for the coordination failure in this case is equivalent to the following condition:
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9
It can be shown that the following condition is equivalent to the condition for the coordination failure in the coordination game; for any t, there exists u such that
for all i 15 . SinceQ i t (s i j ) = (1 − λ) tQi 0 (s i j ), the condition in Proposition 9 can be easily derived. Q.E.D. 15 For example, ifQ i m (s i 1 ) >Q i 0 (s i 2 ), then we assume thatQ i −1 (s i 2 ) is the maximum payoff which both actions give so thatQ i m (s i 1 ) ∈ (Q i 0 (s i 2 ),Q i −1 (s i 2 )]. In addition, letQ i ∞ (s i 2 ) be the minimum payoff which both actions give andQ i ∞+1 (s i 2 ) be the minimum payoff of those which both actions give. Then if
41
